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Abstract 
 
Andersson, M. (2009). Social influence in stock markets. Department of Psychology, 
University of Gothenburg, Sweden 
 
Influences by others when making investments and predictions in stock markets, referred to as 
herding, is a widely discussed phenomenon in financial economics. This thesis aims to 
understand herding by applying theories of social influence. In a series of studies employing a 
multi-trial experimental approach, undergraduates made predictions of stock prices. On each 
trial they received information about the current price and the predictions made by other 
fictitious participants, forming a majority or a minority herd. Study I investigated how 
different rewards altered the level of influence from a herd making random predictions. 
Experiment 1 (n = 80) demonstrated that the tendency to follow others overrides the effect of 
a financial reward for individual performance. In Experiment 2 (n = 80) a reward for 
following a majority herd increased the influence, but a reward for following a minority herd 
did not. Addressing the importance of consistency for herding, in Study II (n = 96) 
consistency was varied both as agreement between the others’ predictions (correlation) and 
within the others’ predictions (variance). Correlation increased the herd influence, but no 
effect of variance was observed. Studies I and II suggested that the influence from a 
consistent random majority herd was associated with the use of a consensus heuristic. Study 
III further explored the processes mediating majority and minority influences, with the focus 
on accuracy motives. The results of Experiment 1 (n = 64) showed that the participants 
followed a majority herd independently of whether its predictions were accurate or random. In 
Experiment 2 (n = 80) the majority influence was reduced by requesting participants to focus 
their attention on the accuracy of the others’ predictions. It was found in Experiment 3 (n = 
60) that a minority herd was influential only when its predictions were accurate and when the 
participants were requested to focus their attention on the accuracy of the others’ predictions. 
The focus instruction thus seemed to break the tendency to use a consensus heuristic. Study 
IV (n = 80) examined whether induced expertise and augmenting the validity of price 
information would have the same effect, showing that the others only influenced participants’ 
predictions when participants were non-experts and the price was invalid. The results of 
Studies I-IV demonstrate that in prediction tasks based on uncertain information people use 
heuristic processing more extensively than has been assumed in previous social influence 
research. A majority herd seems to be influential due to the use of a consensus heuristic. 
However, no support was found for the proposition that minority influence is associated with 
systematic processing. Instead, the tendency to follow the price instead of a minority suggests 
the use of a “minority heuristic”. Factors such as focus instructions, high price validity and 
expertise suppressed heuristic processing. 
 
Keywords: Social influence, Herding, Majority vs. minority influence, Stock markets, 
Financial incentives, Heuristic vs. systematic processing, Predictions, Behavioural finance. 
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Populärvetenskaplig sammanfattning på svenska 
 
På aktiemarknaden finns olika slags information som kan ge vägledning för aktiers 
framtida avkastning. Problemet är att tillförlitligheten i denna information varierar mycket. 
Med tilltagande osäkerhet ökar investerares tendens att se hur andra gör. När många 
investerare fattar liknande beslut uppstår ett ”flockbeteende”. Tidigare forskning bevisar att 
flockbeteende förekommer på aktiemarknaden. Detta ses som ett hinder för en effektiv 
aktiemarknad, eftersom flockar av investerare kan luras in i riskfyllda investeringar, vilket i 
sin tur leder till extrema svängningar i aktiepriser och instabilitet av marknaden. Det är därför 
viktigt att förstå varför flockbeteende uppkommer. 
Den engelska benämningen på flockbeteende (”herding”) liknar investerare vid får 
eller lämlar som blint följer efter flocken. Denna metafor är en överdrift, men frågan är om 
det finns någon sanning i påståendet att flockbeteende är oreflekterat? I denna avhandling har 
jag använt socialpsykologiska teorier för att förstå vilka psykologiska faktorer som orsakar 
flockbeteende på aktiemarknader. 
Information om vad andra tycker och hur de reagerar på denna information är inte bara 
viktig när det gäller aktiehandel, utan i de flesta sammanhang. Därför är det föga förvånande 
att socialt inflytande är ett dominerande område i socialpsykologisk forskning sedan 1950-
talet. Generellt sett finns det två olika typer av socialt inflytande, normativt och informativt. 
Normativt socialt inflytande uppstår för att människor vill uppfylla andras positiva 
förväntningar och motiveras av en önskan att bli accepterad av gruppen. Informativt socialt 
inflytande uppstår när andras beslut antas vara bevis på vad som är korrekt och motiveras av 
en vilja att göra bra bedömningar. I situationer då människor fattar sina beslut anonymt 
minskar betydelsen av önskan att accepteras av gruppen. Istället är en påverkan från andra 
motiverad av att de antas ha viktig information. Eftersom detta oftast är fallet på 
aktiemarknaden inriktas avhandlingen mot informativt inflytande. 
Hur inflytelserik en ”flock” eller grupp är påverkas av dess storlek. Ett tillförlitligt 
resultat av forskning om socialt inflytande är att människor påverkas av majoriteter i högre 
utsträckning än minoriteter. Ju större majoriteten är, desto mer inflytelserik är den vanligtvis. 
Även minoriteter kan ha inflytande. Enligt den mest betydande teorin om majoritets- och 
minoritetsinflytande (Moscovicis ”conversion theory”) sker majoritetsinflytande relativt 
oreflekterat, eftersom de flesta människor önskar tillhöra en majoritet. Inflytandet kan utlösas 
av att människor använder tumregeln ”en majoritet har alltid rätt” när de fattar beslut. 
Minoritetsinflytande är däremot associerat med överlagt tänkande, vilket innebär att 
minoritetens ståndpunkt måste vara övertygande för att få inflytande.  
Är det förnuftigt att följa flocken? Det beror på hur bra flocken presterar. Om 
Moscovicis teori är korrekt och kan tillämpas på aktieinvesteringar, så innebär det en risk att 
man följer en flock som utgör en majoritet oavsett om den gör rätt eller fel, alltså om den gör 
kloka aktieinvesteringar eller inte. Det skulle kunna leda till oväntade och förödande 
konsekvenser på aktiemarknaden. 
I denna avhandling presenteras fyra experimentella studier som belyser flockbeteende 
i en situation som påminner om aktiemarknaden. Det huvudsakliga syftet är fastställa om 
investerare påverkas av en flock när de fattar investeringsbeslut, och om det i så fall spelar 
roll om flocken utgör en majoritet eller en minoritet. Hypotesen är att om flocken utgör en 
majoritet så får den inflytande utan att beslutsfattaren gör ingående övervägande, medan om 
flocken utgör en minoritet så får den inflytande endast om beslutsfattaren blir övertygad om 
att den gör rätt. 
När en investerare fattar beslut om vilken aktie som ska köpas eller säljas gör de en 
bedömning av hur aktiens pris kommer att förändras. I likhet med detta var deltagarnas 
uppgift i avhandlingens samtliga experiment att göra upprepade bedömningar av vad en akties 
pris skulle vara kommande dag. Vid varje bedömning fick deltagarna information om dels 
aktiens nuvarande pris och dels om vilka bedömningar andra deltagare tidigare gjort. De 
andra deltagarna utgjorde flocken. Flockens relativa storlek varierade så att den antingen 
utgjorde en majoritet eller en minoritet. Även tillförlitligheten i den tillgängliga informationen 
varierades. Genom att jämföra deltagarnas bedömningar med flockens bedömningar var det 
möjligt att fastställa graden av flockbeteende under olika betingelser. 
Syftet med den första studien var att undersöka om olika belöningssystem påverkar 
flockbeteende. För att göra så korrekta bedömningar som möjligt borde deltagarna påverkas 
av dagens pris, som var tillförlitligt, istället för flocken som gjorde slumpmässiga 
bedömningar. I ett första experiment fick deltagarna mer betalt ju bättre de presterade, vilket 
borde minska flockens påverkan. Resultaten visade dock att deltagarna följde flocken trots att 
de inte tjänade på det. I det andra experimentet fick deltagarna mer betalt om de följde 
flocken, förutsatt att deras bedömning var korrekt. Det var därför klokt att inte följa efter 
flocken utan att jämföra dess bedömning med ens egen. Flocken utgjorde antingen en 
minoritet eller en majoritet. Resultaten visade att deltagarna följde en majoritet mer än en 
minoritet. Dessa resultat stämmer med hypotesen att majoritetsinflytande sker oreflekterat och 
att minoritetsinflytande sker först efter kritisk granskning. 
För att flockbeteende ska kunna uppstå krävs att flocken är samstämmig. På en 
aktiemarknad kan graden av samstämmighet definieras på olika sätt. Dels spelar det roll hur 
överens man är inom flocken, vilket kan uppskattas som sambandet mellan flockens 
bedömningar, dels hur mycket flockens bedömningar varierar över tid, vilket kan uppskattas 
genom bedömningarnas variation. I den andra studien undersöktes hur stor påverkan dessa två 
aspekter av samstämmighet har på flockens påverkan. Resultaten visade att sambandet ökade 
graden av flockbeteende, medan variationen inte hade någon effekt. Resultaten från både den 
första och andra studien demonstrerar en stark benägenhet att använda tumregeln ”majoriteten 
har alltid rätt”. 
I den tredje studien undersöktes vilka psykologiska processer som kopplas till 
majoritets- och minoritetsinflytande. Detta gjordes genom att variera korrektheten i flockens 
bedömningar, så att de var antingen felaktiga eller korrekta. Flocken utgjorde antingen en 
majoritet eller en minoritet. I samtliga experiment var priset tillförlitligt. Resultaten från ett 
första experiment visade att deltagarna följde flocken när den utgjorde en majoritet, oavsett 
om den gjorde felaktiga eller korrekta bedömningar. Däremot hade flocken inget inflytande 
när den utgjorde en minoritet. Återigen verkade alltså deltagarna följa en majoritet utan att 
överväga. 
Finns det något sätt att undvika att dras med i flocken? I det andra experimentet fick 
deltagarna dessutom uppgiften att bedöma hur bra majoritetsflocken presterade. Denna 
uppgift hade stark effekt. Genom att öka deltagarnas uppmärksamhet på flockens korrekthet 
minskade flockbeteendet drastiskt. I det tredje experimentet användes samma uppgift med 
syftet att åstadkomma inflytande från en minoritetsflock. I detta experiment gjorde 
minoritetsflocken korrekta bedömningar medan priset inte var tillförlitligt. I motsats till 
hypotesen hade minoriteten dock inget inflytande om inte deltagarna gjordes uppmärksamma 
på minoritetens korrekta bedömningar.  
I de tre första studierna tyder resultaten på att flockbeteende sker relativt oreflekterat, 
förutsatt att flocken utgör en majoritet. I dessa studier varierade flockens storlek och 
tillförlitligheten i dess bedömningar. I den fjärde studien varierades istället tillförlitligheten i 
övrig tillgänglig information för att undersöka om det motverkar flockbeteende. Resultaten 
visade att hög tillförlitlighet i priset och tydlig information om detta motverkar inflytande från 
en majoritetsflock. 
Sammanfattningsvis visar resultaten av denna avhandling att det på aktiemarknader 
kan finnas en stark tendens att förlita sig på att majoriteter har rätt och bortse från minoriteter. 
För att undvika oönskat flockbeteende bör investerare vara uppmärksamma på 
tillförlitligheten av flockens prestation. Bättre och tydligare information skulle därför 
sannolikt också öka chansen att investerare bortser från flocken. Att vara medveten om att 
tillgänglig information på börsen inte är tillförlitlig och att inse att majoriteten inte alltid har 
rätt är följaktligen en bra utgångspunkt för en lyckad aktiehandel. 
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 1
Introduction 
 
A Homo economicus can be described as an antisocial species interacting with others 
only for the benefit of gaining valuable information. This implies that Homo economicus is 
not influenced by others unless it is rational to be so. In contrast, Homo sapiens (humans, 
investors included) are frequently influenced by other humans. This social influence is usually 
beneficial in the sense that it improves decisions. However, social influence may also be 
elicited when it is not beneficial. This may for instance occur when making stock market 
investments. Investors who imitate each other have been described as mindless sheep blindly 
following the herd, frantic during booms and terrified during market crashes (Shiller, 2000). 
The aim of the present thesis is to understand why social influences occur in stock markets. 
Investors’ tendency to behave in similar ways is referred to as herding (Sias, 2004). 
This tendency may be due to inferences about others’ private information that people make by 
observing their actions. In general, herding is viewed as an impediment in financial markets, 
because herds are said to be lured into risky ventures without acquiring enough information 
and appreciating the risk of the investment (Bikchandani & Sharma, 2000). This may induce 
aggravated volatility, which in turn increases the fragility of financial markets and therefore 
destabilises the broader market system (Bikchandani & Sharma, 2000; Chari & Koebe, 2004). 
Furthermore, herding may lead to unbeneficial outcomes for the investor (Celen & Kariv, 
2004). Understanding the phenomenon of herding is hence essential. 
The tendency to follow others has been observed in many contexts, for example in 
consumption, in expressing opinions, or even in simple decision making, such as whether or 
not to cross a street. In social psychology this behaviour is referred to as conformity (Cialdini 
& Goldstein, 2004) stemming from social influence. A general conclusion in social-influence 
research is that majorities are more influential than minorities. An ongoing debate concerns 
whether majority and minority influences are associated with different types of processing. 
Moscovici (1976, 1980, 1985) argued that majority influence is associated with less cognitive 
processing effort, and that minority influence is associated with more cognitive processing 
effort. Minorities may therefore be as influential as majorities. It is here proposed that this 
theory has bearings on the understanding of herding in financial markets. 
As a starting point, the empirical studies presented in this thesis will examine whether 
consistency within and size of a herd (majority vs. minority) matter for the existence of 
herding. We then investigate the degree of processing effort associated with majority and 
minority influences, respectively. Before summarising and discussing the empirical studies, 
the sections that follow provide an overview of economic and psychological definitions, 
implications, and empirical evidence of herding. This is followed by a review of research on 
social influence. 
 
Herding 
 
Introduction 
Herding is a widely studied phenomenon in behavioural finance (e.g., Bikchandani & 
Sharma, 2000; Shiller, 2000; Sias, 2004). The concept is believed to have the potential to 
explain a number of financial phenomena, such as volatility of, momentum and reversals in 
stock prices. Although used frequently, herding is a vague term. It refers to investors as 
animals, like lemmings or sheep, who go browsing passively from one field to another, 
following others without ever examining whether the grass is greener somewhere else. While 
this metaphor of course is an exaggeration, does it to some extent represent investor 
behaviour? If so, what are the investors’ reasons for imitating each other? In this section I will 
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discuss definitions of herding, distinguish a number of proposed causes of herding and 
selectively review the empirical evidence. 
 
Definitions 
“The truth is rarely pure and never simple.” 
Oscar Wilde (1854 – 1900) 
 
An abundance of research has explored the distinction between rational and irrational 
herding. According to the research in financial economics, both forms exist. If an investor has 
limited knowledge and information about which stocks to buy, and an analyst who has been 
successful in the past and has a good reputation gives a reasonable recommendation, it may be 
considered rational to follow it. The view of herding as rational centres on optimal decision 
making altered by information or incentives. However, people may herd for other reasons, 
such as time constraints, leading to decisions that are conceived of as irrational. The view of 
herding as irrational centres on investor psychology, stating that investors follow each other 
without rational analysis. The intermediate view states that investors are boundedly rational, 
using heuristics that decrease the cost of information processing (Devenow & Welch, 1996). 
Still, some researchers appear to believe that theories about herding without connection to 
rational choice are not worth considering (e.g. Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2000; Devenow & 
Welch, 1996). From a psychological perspective, it is however hard to justify these 
distinctions based on rationality. For example, if an investor follows the herd because of lack 
of time to invest in the effort to obtain information or to make further analysis on which to 
base an investment decision, why should this not be conceived of as rational? The aim of this 
thesis is to focus on the herding phenomenon, irrespective of whether or not it is rational. 
In general, herding is defined as investors’ tendency to follow each other into and out of 
the same stocks (Sias, 2004). A prerequisite for such behaviour is the existence of interaction 
among investors. One major distinction is the difference between following each other 
because of indirect influences among investors and because of direct influences among 
investors. 
Four main causes of indirect influences among investors have been proposed in 
previous research: common knowledge, fads, common investment strategies and similar 
compensation schemes. First, common knowledge (also called investigative herding) refers to 
that investors follow the same or correlated signals, or that the trade information is correlated 
across sections (Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1992; Grinblatt, Titman, & Wermers, 1995). 
Second, fads refer to that investors buy the same stocks simply because they become more 
popular (Sias, 2004). Third, investors may systematically follow certain investment styles 
(Wermers, 2000) such as momentum trading, which refers to active investment in high past-
return stocks (Grinblatt et al., 1995). For example, if investors buy stocks in one industry one 
quarter, their increased demand will probably result in a higher value of such stocks. Then 
other investors will buy the same stocks the next quarter due to expected high returns. Fourth, 
compensation schemes determining how much investors will be paid may reward their 
performance relative to others’ performance, and therefore deviations from the market 
consensus may cause an undesired cost (Rajan, 1994). 
Conversely, herding due to direct influences among investors is said to arise from 
information cascades, where every subsequent actor independently of private information 
makes the same choice based on the observations of others (e.g. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & 
Welch, 1992), or reputational herding, which refers to that making choices that deviate from 
the consensus forecast imposes costs for investors in terms of impaired reputation (Scharfstein 
& Stein, 1990). It is important to note that the causes of herding are not mutually exclusive. 
Thus, investors may herd for several reasons simultaneously. 
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The empirical approaches examining herding can be divided into analyses of actual 
market behaviour and laboratory experiments. The latter mainly investigates information 
cascades. Studies of market behaviour make no distinction between direct and indirect 
herding, and in general do not investigate the causes of the phenomenon. Instead, herding is 
assumed to exist if a number of institutions or individuals buy or sell the same funds at the 
same time. An obvious problem with this assumption is that since it is unknown on what basis 
the investors made their decisions, observations of market behaviour do not prove the 
existence of herding due to direct influence but only that investors make similar decisions. In 
a real-world setting, it is impossible to assess the investors’ private information. In contrast, 
laboratory environments allow for control of both public and private information, which 
facilitates explicit tests of causal explanations. In the following I will review previous 
theoretical and empirical findings, first the results revealed by analyses of market behaviour 
(which make no explicit distinction between herding due to direct and indirect influences), 
and then results regarding herding due to direct influences (information cascades and 
reputational herding). 
 
Analyses of Market Behaviour 
Here I will selectively review the main results of financial studies on market 
behaviour. As already mentioned, a common feature of these studies is that they interpret 
observed mass behaviour as herding. Therefore, hereafter herding has both direct and indirect 
influences among investors. 
Despite strong theoretical reasons to expect herding, the empirical evidence from 
analyses of market data points in opposing directions; while some studies confirm the 
existence of herding in financial markets (e.g. Guedj & Bouchaud, 2005; Sias, 2004), others 
do not (e.g., Drehmann, Oechssler, & Roider, 2005; Grinblatt et al., 1995; Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1992; Wermers, 1999). The different results can partly be explained by 
how herding is quantified. One common measure for quantification is the Lakonishok (1992) 
measure, in which large imbalances between the numbers of buyers and sellers in stocks are 
assumed to be evidence of herding. More specifically, for the measure assesses cross-
sectional temporal dependence by recognising whether investors follow each other into and 
out of the same stocks over some period of time. Studies applying this measure (e.g., Grinblatt 
et al., 1995; Wermers, 1999) show a lower level of herding compared to studies applying 
other measures (e.g., Bennett, Sias, & Starks, 2003; Nofsinger & Sias, 1999; Sias, 2004). A 
recent study that applied both the Lakonishok (1992) and the Sias (2004) measures to the 
same data found compelling evidence of herding (Puckett & Yan, 2008). 
Herding occurs in different situations, in different firms and at different organisational 
levels. Empirical evidence of herding has been found in trading of securities (e.g. Hirshleifer, 
Subrahmanyam, & Titman, 1994; Holden & Subrahmanyam, 1996), as well as in forecasts by 
stock analysts and other forecasters (e.g. Ashiya & Doi, 2001; Cote & Sanders, 1997; Ehrbeck 
& Waldmann, 1996). 
Several factors are known to impact the level of herding. One factor is the degree of 
noise in information. In small-capitalisation securities the private information tends to be 
noisier. Institutional investors therefore place greater weight on the herd’s decisions when 
investing in such securities (Wermers, 1999). Along the same lines, Bennett et al. (2003) 
concluded that the information advantage is larger in small-capitalisation securities. Related 
to this is the difference between large and small firms in the tendency to herd. Since large 
firms may have larger absolute benefits from attaining precise information and lower costs for 
information acquisition, they tend to be fashion leaders and invest when others do not. Small 
firms tend to be followers of large firms’ investments (Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003). Another 
factor is the age of investors; senior investors are less likely to herd. Managers are trained by 
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studying the decisions and performance of other managers both within and across firms, 
which implies that they in a sense are trained to take others’ opinions into account (Hong, 
Kubik, & Solomon, 2000).  
Overall, the strength of market data analyses is their external validity. Still, if the aim 
is to find conclusive evidence of the existence and the causes of herding, an experimental 
approach is preferable. 
 
Information Cascades 
The research on information cascades concerns situations where people have uncertain 
private information and make sequential decisions that are publicly disclosed. In a typical 
scenario, a respondent reveals his or her decision, and subsequent actors follow this decision 
even if it contradicts their private information. To illustrate, think of a person who chooses 
between two unfamiliar, apparently similar restaurants situated on opposite sides of a street. 
Assume that the person has heard others’ mixed opinions about one of the restaurants (A) and 
only good things about the other (B). When approaching the restaurants, the person notes that 
restaurant A is more crowded than restaurant B. Many people would probably then choose 
restaurant A. A restaurant queue, without any proof that the restaurant is better than the other, 
may thus be enough to attract additional customers, even if they have opposing private 
information. This is because people base their decisions on choices made by others. In 
contrast, if they would discuss the decisions and critically assess their first impressions, they 
might be able to figure out which restaurant is in fact preferable. Information cascades start in 
a stock market when investors ignore their own information and instead infer information 
from a herd (Sias, 2004). 
Despite essential differences, the terms herding and information cascades are sometimes 
used interchangeably in research in financial economics. The most important difference 
concerns the degree of imitation. According to Smith and SØrensen (2000), an information 
cascade occurs when a sequence of investors ignore their private information when making 
decisions, and individual behaviour therefore becomes entirely imitative. Herding occurs 
when an infinite sequence of investors make identical decisions, although their actions may 
still reflect private information. As a result, an information cascade is stable because 
additional private information does not cause changes in the behaviour, whereas in herding 
additional private information may cause dramatic and sudden shifts (Celen & Kariv, 2004). 
According to these definitions, information cascades are recognised through unobservable 
beliefs and thus are more difficult to detect than herding. 
In a typical experiment on information cascades (e.g. Anderson & Holt, 1997), 
participants predict which of two events will take place. In each trial, they receive a cue, a or 
b, corresponding to the outcomes A and B with a predetermined probability. The cue is 
private and the prediction is publicly announced, thus participants in each trial receive 
information about the private cue and the decisions made by preceding participants. An 
information cascade occurs when a participant observes two consecutive identical decisions 
(A, A) and, despite contrary private information (b), chooses the same option (A). Anderson 
and Holt (1997) found that cascades are formed when the decisions made in the initial trials 
coincide, and they concluded that following the established pattern in such cases is consistent 
with reasoning according to Bayes’ rule, that is to revise one’s beliefs by optimally utilising 
diagnostic information. However, they also found that in about half of the cases when a 
cascade was observed, the participants’ choices were interpreted as an incorrect action. 
Hung and Plott (2001) investigated how the tendency to engage in information 
cascades is altered by different financial rewards. Replicating the results of Anderson and 
Holt (1997), they showed that when participants were rewarded for making correct decisions, 
they followed the others preceding them. When rewarded only if the group’s answer was 
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correct, participants instead relied more on private information, which made the group’s 
collective judgment more accurate than that of the cascading groups. It was also found that 
participants placed even more weight on the decisions made by others when rewarded for 
making the same decisions as they did.  
Information cascades provide a rationale for the imitative behaviour observed among 
investors. However, the information cascade experiments have recently been subject to 
criticisms that seem to make them inapplicable to real financial investments. It has been 
shown that information cascades are inhibited if the dichotomous tasks in information cascade 
experiments are made continuous (Celen & Kariv, 2004). Information cascades then become 
less frequent and in almost all cases, participant choices are normatively correct. In 
information cascade experiments, the cost of taking action is held constant, thus the price of a 
stock does not change according to supply and demand. If the participants instead choose 
between assets with market-determined prices, it has been argued that information cascades 
cannot start (Avery & Zemsky, 1998). In this case, participants trade on the difference 
between their own information (the history of trades and their private signal) and their 
common information (the history of trades only). It will then never be the case that they 
neglect their own information and instead imitate others. For this reason, the price aggregates 
the information contained in the history of the previous trades correctly. The criticisms have 
been addressed in a model proposed by Chari and Koehe (2004), who argue that the 
development of cascades under the defined circumstances depends on the timing of decisions. 
The criticisms concern experiments with exogenous timing, which means that investors make 
their decisions in a predetermined order. If timing is instead endogenous, which means that 
investors make their decisions whenever they want, Chari and Koehe (2004) argue that 
information cascades reappear, even when signals are continuous or prices are flexible. Sgroi 
(2003) showed that with exogenous timing, cascades remained ubiquitous. 
Further doubts concerning the rationality in information cascades have recently 
emerged. In a recent study by Spiwoks, Bizer and Hein (2008), only 36% of all decisions 
were rational, and only a small number of those making a rational decision were able to state 
a correct reason for why their decision was rational. 
 
Reputational Herding 
A prerequisite for reputational herding to occur is, like in information cascades, 
interdependencies among individual decisions. However, the two forms of herding differ in 
the underlying motivation; whereas information cascades result from individuals’ incomplete 
information, reputational herding is a result of the motivation to earn social approval or avoid 
disapproval. 
According to Trueman (1994), analysts prefer to release forecasts that are similar to 
expectations of future earnings, even though a more extreme forecast would be justified by his 
or her private information. Releasing a forecast similar to expectations of future earnings may 
positively impact the investors’ impression of the analyst’s capacity and trustworthiness and 
thus enable the analysts to charge higher fees for the forecast. A sign of herding is that the 
probability that an announced forecast is similar to those released by other analysts is larger 
than would be justified by private information. In reputational herding, acting differently from 
the herd imposes an additional cost on investors.  
An explanation to reputational herding is related to Keynes’ (1936) notion that failing 
conventionally is better for one’s reputation than succeeding unconventionally. This is 
because investors who herd are able to share the blame and hide in the herd when making 
unfavourable investment decisions (Devenow & Welch, 1996). Along the same lines, 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) propose that an unprofitable investment harms a decision maker 
considerably less when others have made similar investments, which constitutes a reputational 
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reason for investors to ignore private information in favour of trading with the herd. Parallel 
to this explanation is Palley’s (1995) argument that herding is based on the principle of ‘safety 
in numbers’, assuming that managers are individually risk averse, and that their reward is 
partly based on relative performance. 
Empirical results support that reputational concerns may trigger herding. Younger asset 
managers, whose career concerns are normally stronger than older asset managers since they 
are facing a longer working life ahead, deviate less from the average market decision (Hong, 
et al., 2000). This result is related to risk taking; making investments that deviate from the 
consensus forecast imposes a higher risk of being fired for young and inexperienced managers 
(Arora & Ou-Yang, 2001; Chevalier & Ellison, 1999). Experiments with professional stock 
analysts have also demonstrated reputational herding. In a study of continuous choice (Cote & 
Sanders, 1997), participants predicted earnings in the following year. After a prediction had 
been made, a consensus of analysts’ predictions was shown to the participants, whereafter 
they had the opportunity to adjust their own predictions. Consistent with reputational herding, 
the results showed that the consensus had a significant influence on the predictions, and that 
the level of herding was related to the analysts’ perception of their own ability and their 
motivation to preserve or create a good reputation. 
 
Social Influence 
 
“When people are free to do as they please, they usually imitate each other” 
Eric Hoffer (1902-1983) 
 
Empirical Findings 
Information about what others think and how people react to this information is 
abundant in everyday life. Therefore, it is not surprising that social influence has been and 
continues to be a dominant area of social psychological research (e.g. De Dreu & De Vries, 
2001). One of the most prominent theories of social influence is Festinger’s (1954) theory of 
social comparison processes, which suggests that there are incentives to reach consensus 
within groups. This makes group members dependent on the group in terms of social approval 
and verification of beliefs. Due to a lack of objective means for verification, others’ attitudes 
and beliefs are used as validation.  
Festinger’s theory that people seek agreement with the majority has two motives: they 
wish to be accepted by or belong to the majority (and avoid belonging to the minority), and 
they believe that the majority is more correct than themselves. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) 
extended this argument by distinguishing between normative and informational social 
influence. Normative social influence refers to matching others’ positive expectations and is 
based on the desire to obtain social acceptance. Informational social influence refers to using 
others’ choices as evidence of the truth, motivated by the goal to form an accurate judgment 
of reality and behave correctly. Normative social influence is expected to induce public 
compliance without private acceptance, whereas informational social influence is expected to 
induce both public compliance and private internalisation of others’ opinions. In order to 
capture the distinction between normative and informative social influence in experimental 
studies, researchers have used different paradigms. Most commonly, variants of the Asch 
paradigm, in which there is a face-to-face interaction between participants and their 
confederates, are used to capture normative influence, and variants of the Crutchfield 
paradigm, in which participants are placed in individual cubicles and receive false feedback of 
the confederates’ responses, are used to capture informative influence (Bond & Smith, 1996). 
It is however difficult to conclusively distinguish between the two forms of social influence, 
both theoretically and empirically (David & Turner, 2001). 
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Altering behaviour to comply with others’ responses is referred to as conformity 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). A number of factors are known to mediate conformity (Bond & 
Smith, 1996), such as the relationship between the group and the participants, anonymity in 
response, stimulus materials and task difficulty. Another important factor is the relationship 
between group size and social influence. Asch (1956) found that the level of conformity is 
negligible with only one confederate, increases rapidly when two to four additional 
confederates’ opinions are presented to participants, and is approximately the same with 4-15 
confederates. The results of subsequent studies, using variants of the Asch paradigm, have 
confirmed that the relative magnitude of social influence increases as a function of group size 
(Latané & Wolf, 1981).  
It also matters whether the source of influence constitutes a majority or a minority. 
The majority-minority distinction refers to the proportion of individuals holding a certain 
position. The minority must always be numerically smaller than the majority, which most 
commonly constitutes more than 50% of the group. In a meta-analysis, Bond (2005) 
concluded that overall the relationship between conformity and the size of the majority is 
positive and linear. However, according to Bond and Smith (1996), the relationship depends 
on the paradigm (the Asch paradigm vs. the Crutchfield paradigm) and the response (private 
vs. public). When responses are private, there is a strong positive relationship in studies using 
the Crutchfield paradigm and a slightly negative relationship in studies using the Asch 
paradigm. When responses are public, the relationship is weak and positive in studies 
regardless of which paradigm is used.  
Fewer studies have investigated the relationship between group size and minority 
influence. Nemeth, Wachtler and Endicott (1977) used a colour perception task to examine 
the effects of different sizes of minorities, and found that increasing the size of a minority 
increases its perceived competence. The study was set up so that when the absolute size of the 
minority increased, the relative difference between the minority and the majority decreased. A 
strong effect of a minority consisting of more than one person was found, but the effect 
decreased when the relative difference between the minority and the majority was small. 
Consensus information seems to have different effects on majority and minority 
influence. A study by Martin, Gardikiotis and Hewstone (2002) showed that when 
participants were presented with information expressed as proportions of others, majorities 
always had more influence on participants’ attitudes than minorities, irrespective of whether 
the difference between the groups was small or large. The presentation of consensus 
information also seems to affect social influence (Gardikiotis, Martin, & Hewstone, 2005). 
When consensus was described in terms of descriptive adjectives (large vs. small), large 
sources were more influential than small sources, irrespective of whether the source was a 
majority or a minority. When consensus instead was described in terms of percentages, the 
majority was more influential than the minority, irrespective of being large or small. Overall, 
minority influences seem to be more sensitive to both the relative size of the source of 
influence and how the consensus information is framed. 
It is clear that both majorities and minorities may influence people’s decisions and 
attitudes, albeit under different circumstances. Explanations to peoples’ reactions to others’ 
beliefs have been proposed for a long time (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). The most discussed 
theoretical approaches and their associated empirical evidence are summarised below. 
 
Theories of Social Influence 
Different assumptions have been made regarding cognitive and motivational processes 
involved in majority and minority influences. Moscovici’s (1976, 1980, 1985) conversion 
theory views majority influence as normative, whereas Mackie’s (1987) objective consensus 
approach views majority influence as informational. Similarities with both approaches are 
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found in the more recent source-position congruency model (Baker & Petty, 1994) and the 
cognitive response approach (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
Conversion Theory. In Moscovici’s (1976, 1980, 1985) conversion theory, all attempts 
of social influence are expected to create conflict between the source and the target. Two 
ways of solving such conflicts are proposed: conforming to the majority’s view and accepting 
the minority’s view. Majority influence initiates a process of social comparison, where the 
relationship between the majority group and the target of influence is in focus. Since people 
generally wish to belong to the majority, they conform to its view without considering its 
message in detail. In contrast, a distinctive minority may motivate a validation process that 
leads to careful examination of the minority's arguments in order to understand them and 
understand why they disagree with the majority. If the target of influence is persuaded by the 
minority’s view, minority influence occurs and the initial conflict is resolved. According to 
Moscovici, Lage and Naffrechoux (1969), minorities create conflicts with the majority 
because they offer a new perspective. Since people in general do not wish to publicly agree 
with the minority, attitude change following minority influence is likely to be only observed 
on indirect measures (Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994). 
Contrary to single-process models in which majority and minority influences differ 
primarily in degree (e.g., Latané & Wolf, 1981), conversion theory is a dual-process theory 
postulating qualitative differences between majority and minority influences. In sum, these 
differences concern direction of attention, content of thinking, and differential influence 
(Martin & Hewstone, 2001). Concerning direction of attention, the perception of a majority 
makes individuals focus on the difference between themselves and the majority members, 
whereas the perception of a minority makes individuals focus on the content of the minority’s 
message. Concerning content of thinking, minority influences can make individuals 
reconsider their own beliefs and consider a minority position as a viable alternative, whereas 
majority influence leads to a superficial examination of the majority arguments. Differences 
in content of thinking result in differences in message processing. Concerning differential 
influence, minorities cause more private and indirect influence while the opposite is evident 
for majorities. 
Other approaches to social influence share the dual-process assumption, but make 
predictions that differ from those of conversion theory. 
The Objective Consensus Theory. The major challenge to conversion theory is 
Mackie’s (1987) objective consensus theory, which, in direct contrast to conversion theory, 
postulates that a majority source rather than a minority source induces message elaboration. 
This assumption is based on two premises. First, a majority sharing the same opinion 
indicates that their message is valid and therefore attracts attention. If an individual’s view 
differs from the majority’s view, he or she will attempt to understand the discrepancy, which 
results in considerable analysis of the message. Second, the ‘false consensus heuristic’ 
(Martin & Hewstone, 2001) makes people believe they share the same attitudes and norms 
with people in the majority and thus differ from those in the minority. When one is exposed to 
a counter-attitudinal majority, the consensus breaks down and people become motivated to 
analyse the majority’s arguments in order to identify the differences in opinion. When one is 
exposed to a counter-attitudinal minority, it is less likely to motivate analysis of the minority’s 
message. An implication is that individuals are expected to agree with the majority and 
disagree with the minority, thus majority influences rely on informational aspects rather than 
normative aspects as in conversion theory. There is relatively little evidence for the main 
implication of the objective consensus theory. In fact, the meta-analysis by Wood et al. (1994) 
supports conversion theory. 
Recently, there has been a shift in theoretical developments, which has led to the 
acknowledgement that neither majorities nor minorities are associated exclusively with degree 
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of analysis of a message (Martin & Hewstone, 2003). Therefore, contingency approaches 
arguing that the relationship between majority and minority influence and the level of 
message analysis are contingent on additional factors have gained increasing attention. 
The Source/Position Congruency Theory. Baker and Petty’s (1994) source/position 
congruency theory posits that a more thorough message analysis occurs in cases with counter-
attitudinal majority or pro-attitudinal minority (unbalanced situations) than in cases with 
counter-attitudinal minority or pro-attitudinal majority (balanced situations). In pro-attitudinal 
conditions, where the message from the minority is thoroughly analysed, the conversion 
theory and the source/position congruency theory make the same predictions, whereas in a 
counter-attitudinal condition, where the message from the majority is thoroughly analysed, the 
objective consensus theory and the source/position congruency theory make the same 
predictions.  
In sum, three main predictions concerning which source is associated with a more 
thorough message analysis can be derived from the theories presented above: the minority 
(conversion theory, Moscovici, 1976, 1980, 1985), the majority (objective consensus theory, 
Mackie, 1987), and either the majority or the minority, depending on whether the source and 
message direction is balanced or unbalanced (source/position congruency theory, Baker & 
Petty, 1994). Recent research has continued to focus on additional factors that impact majority 
and minority influence. The cognitive response approach is a way of testing such predictions 
since it provides a useful technique for determining when a detailed analysis of a message has 
occurred. 
The Cognitive Response Approach. The focal point of the cognitive response approach 
is how cognition affects how persuasive arguments are processed, which may potentially 
provide a more detailed understanding of the underlying processes involved in majority and 
minority influence. The level of message analysis determines how influential the message will 
be and thus how much it will change a person’s attitude. In cases when messages do not 
generate any supporting or non-supporting thoughts, the message will not affect attitudes. 
The cognitive response approach is based on theories of persuasion, that is the 
Elaboration Likelihood Theory (ELT, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic Systematic 
Theory (HST, Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Both of these theories distinguish between high 
elaboration modes (ELT central-route and HST systematic processing) and low elaboration 
modes (ELT peripheral-route and HST heuristic processing), which demand more and less 
cognitive effort on behalf of recipients of persuasive communication, respectively.1 Also, they 
both predict that an individual needs motivation and ability to pass an elaboration threshold in 
order to ensure that systematic processing occurs. Systematic processing involves careful 
evaluation of information. On the other hand, in heuristic processing people are not motivated 
or able to process the message, and therefore persuasion may occur due to some cue in the 
source of influence, like status, or the use of a ‘consensus implies correctness’ heuristic 
(hereafter referred to as the ‘consensus heuristic’) implying that ‘the majority is always right’ 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 
 
Integration 
The application of concepts and methodologies derived from the cognitive response 
approach has recently been increasingly involved and used in contemporary research on 
majority and minority influence. In this vein, Maass and Clark (1983, 1984) equated 
Moscovici’s (1976, 1980, 1985) concepts of comparison and validation with systematic and 
heuristic processing, a parallel implying that minority influence is associated with systematic 
                                               
1
 The terminology derived from ELT and HST has been used interchangeably in the literature. Here, we use the 
terms systematic and heuristic processing. 
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processing and majority influence with heuristic processing. In contrast, the objective 
consensus theory would predict that systematic processing occurs in majority influence. 
One commonly used method to distinguish between the different modes of processing 
is to vary the quality of arguments in the message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Strong 
arguments should have a larger influence than weak arguments if a message is systematically 
processed, but if it is not, no such difference should be found. Several studies have applied 
this approach (e.g. Gardikiotis et al., 2005; Martin et al., 2002; Martin & Hewstone, 2003). 
Most previous research has distinguished between the extremes of the processing continuum, 
that is that message processing is either heuristic or systematic. Only a few recent studies 
have paid attention to processing occurring between the extremes, labelled intermediate 
processing (e.g. Bohner, Dykema-Engblade, Tindale, & Meisenhelder, 2008; Martin, 
Hewstone, & Martin, 2007). 
The fact that both majorities and minorities may be influential is established, but 
whether the influence is associated with systematic or heuristic processing is still uncertain. 
Recent studies have investigated specific circumstances in order to determine the relationship 
between a majority-minority distinction and processing effort. One example is a study 
investigating how cognitive effort dedicated to the processing of minority and majority 
communication was related to prior attitudes (Erb, Bohner, Rank, & Einwiller, 2002). The 
results revealed an interaction between intensity of prior opinions and type of processing. 
When participants had an opinion that opposed that expressed by a majority or a minority, the 
message from the minority was systematically processed and the majority message was 
heuristically processed in line with the predictions from conversion theory (Moscovici, 1976, 
1980, 1985). When participants instead held opposing opinions, in line with Mackie’s (1987) 
objective consensus theory, the majority messages were systematically processed. 
The results of experiments by Martin, Martin, Smith, and Hewstone (2007) indicated 
that minority influences instigate systematic processing and thereby generate stronger 
attitudes, whereas majority influence is based on heuristic processing and generates weaker 
attitudes. When the topic was of low personal relevance the results were the same, but when 
the topic was of high personal relevance, systematic processing seemed to occur both in 
majority and minority influence. Another study (Martin, Hewstone, & Martin, 2008) 
concluded that minority influence causes attitudes that are more resistant to counter-
persuasion than those caused by majority influence. When type of processing was 
manipulated by requesting participants to recall the message, assumed to increase systematic 
processing, the attitudes formed following both majority and minority influences resisted a 
second counter message. Martin, Hewstone et al. (2007) manipulated type of processing by 
varying either motivational or cognitive factors at three levels. The two types of factors 
yielded consistent results: When low processing was induced, the majority position was 
accepted after heuristic processing and no minority influence was found. When intermediate 
processing was induced, only the information from the minority source was processed 
systematically. When high processing was induced, both the majority’s and minority’s 
messages were processed systematically. When crossing source size (majority vs. minority) 
with message strength (high vs. ambiguous vs. low) and with framing, Bohner et al. (2008) 
found that when the source was framed as being similar to participants in terms of knowledge, 
interests, and educational and demographic backgrounds, systematic processing occurred for 
arguments stated by a minority but not by a majority, regardless of message quality. When the 
source was framed as being more knowledgeable, systematic processing occurred in minority 
conditions when the message quality was high and low, but in majority conditions when the 
message quality was ambiguous. The results bear similarities to Martin et al.’s (e.g. Martin, 
Martin et al., 2007) and Moscovici’s (1976, 1980, 1985) predictions in that systematic 
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processing occurred in minority conditions independent of framing, but only in majority 
conditions under knowledge framing.  
Taken together, the results suggest that the question of whether majorities and 
minorities instigate heuristic or systematic processing can only be answered by taking into 
account additional factors such as participants’ prior attitudes (Erb et al., 2002), personal 
relevance (Martin, Martin et al., 2007), memory recall (Martin et al., 2008), outcome 
relevance and orienting tasks (Martin, Hewstone et al., 2007), and framing of the source of 
influence (Bohner et al., 2008). One conclusion is that majority messages only instigate 
systematic processing in the presence of additional factors such as instructions that increase 
processing depth. Thus, whether majorities or minorities induce systematic processing is less 
of an issue than what one does and what the outcomes are. The empirical studies summarised 
below address this issue further applied to social influence on predictions of stock prices. 
 
Summary of the Empirical Studies 
 
Overview 
The primary aim of the empirical studies is to investigate whether investors are herding 
when making predictions, and whether the level of herding depends on if the herd constitutes 
a majority or a minority. A second aim is to investigate whether theories of social influence 
apply to predictions of stock prices. The general hypothesis is that if the herd is a majority, 
people use a consensus heuristic and follow the majority, whereas if the herd is a minority, 
influence occurs only if the minority’s predictions are perceived as accurate. 
In Study I, participants’ predictions of up or down market states were analysed with 
respect to how different rewards altered the level of herding. In Studies II, III, and IV, 
participants made predictions of the future price of a given fictitious stock conditional on 
information about the current price and five fictitious others’ predictions. The participants 
were undergraduates at the University of Gothenburg, Göteborg, Sweden, recruited from a 
pool of undergraduates enrolled in different educational programmes who had volunteered to 
take part in experiments. 
 
Study I 
The aim of Study I was to analyse how financial incentives impact the level of herding. 
Experiment 1 investigated the effect of a bonus for individual performance on the tendency to 
herd with a majority, and Experiment 2 examined whether the effect of a financial reward for 
following the herd varied for majority and minority herds. 
In a review of the effects of financial rewards in experiments, Camerer and Hogarth 
(1999) concluded that these effects are varied and complex. The presence and level of 
financial rewards seem to affect performance in judgment tasks, in particular when increased 
effort would improve performance. Financial rewards for individual performance were 
expected to increase systematic processing in the same way as increased outcome relevance 
has been shown to do (Kerr, 2002; Martin, Hewstone et al., 2007). However, since the 
uncertainty of the information in the applied prediction task was high, heuristic processing 
was still likely to be elicited, in particular when the herd constitutes a majority. Accordingly, 
it was proposed that financial rewards for individual performance would have no effect on 
majority influence. In contrast, financially rewarding group performance may enhance 
herding with a majority since it reinforces heuristic processing. However, the presence of a 
minority herd may elicit critical assessments of its message. In this case, the minority will not 
be influential despite financial rewards. 
A repeated individual decision-making task similar to that devised by Massey and Wu 
(2004) was employed. Participants made binary predictions of a future ‘upmarket’ or 
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‘downmarket’. A ‘signal’ was presented on each trial consisting of a number randomly 
sampled from either an upmarket or downmarket. In herd conditions additional information 
was given about predictions made by three fictitious other participants. These predictions 
were randomly generated so that two of the three others (the majority) always made the same 
predictions, and one other (the minority) made a deviating prediction. 
To consistently follow the signal would result in an average of 75% accurate responses. 
Hence, participants would be less accurate by following the herd instead of the signal. 
Performance was assessed by means of measures of outcome accuracy (percentages of correct 
predictions of upmarket and downmarket) and decision strategy (percentages of following the 
signal and percentages of following the herd). 
In Experiment 1, the participants (n = 80) were randomly assigned to four groups: the 
individual and the herd conditions with or without bonus. In the bonus conditions, the 
participants were guaranteed 50 SEK but could receive an additional 0-190 SEK depending 
on performance. For each correct prediction, they received 4 SEK. In the no-bonus condition, 
the participants received 150 SEK, which was close to the average payments in the bonus 
conditions. 
In line with expectations, the results showed that the participants’ predictions in the 
individual conditions followed the signal to a larger extent than did the participants’ 
predictions in the herd conditions. The participants in the bonus conditions furthermore 
followed the signal significantly more than did participants in the no-bonus conditions. Thus, 
the bonus increased participants’ utilisation of the signal and thus the accuracy in their 
predictions in the individual conditions. No significant difference was observed when the herd 
conditions were compared in terms of the tendency to follow the herd, implying that 
participants followed the herd irrespective of the bonus for individual performance. This 
result is consistent with the hypothesis that an individual bonus had no effect on the level of 
herding. 
Experiment 2 (n = 40) investigated whether the effect of a financial reward for 
following the herd differed when the herd was a majority or a minority. The materials and 
procedure were similar to those in Experiment 1, but in addition to the individual bonus (2 
SEK) for making accurate predictions, a bonus (4 SEK) was obtained for either being accurate 
when the majority (majority-bonus condition) or the minority (minority-bonus condition) 
made accurate predictions.  
Consistent with the hypothesis, the results of Experiment 2 indicated that the 
participants in the majority-bonus condition followed the herd more and thus the signal less 
than the participants in the minority-bonus condition. Taken together, the results are in line 
with the hypothesis that the use of a consensus heuristic overrides systematic processing in 
majority influence, whereas the reverse is true for minority influence. 
 
Study II 
The aim of Study II was to explore the importance of consistency among others for 
herding to occur. Consistency may be defined in different ways. In a stock market it is likely 
that perceptions of consistency are based on repeated observations over time. Consistency 
may then be perceived as the agreement across time among investors’ predictions. In addition, 
consistency may be related to variance over time in each investor’s predictions. Investors who 
are in agreement with others and do not vary their predictions substantially from time to time 
would appear more reliable, and they are therefore likely to exert a stronger influence. In 
Study I, consistency was confounded with the number of others who made the same 
prediction in each trial. Two of the three others (the majority) were in agreement on each trial, 
but the majority did not consist of the same others from trial to trial. Therefore, it was not 
possible to conclude whether the influence was due to the consistency among the others or to 
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the fact that the others constituted a majority. The setup in Study II therefore captured how 
consistency may be perceived over time in terms of variance in and correlation between the 
others’ predictions across trials.  
In the reported experiment, neither the others’ predictions nor the current price were 
valid cues. When the others’ predictions were perceived not to be in agreement and to vary 
from trial to trial, the participants were expected to judge the current price as a more valid cue 
than the others’ predictions. On the other hand, when the others’ predictions were in 
agreement and did not vary considerably form trial to trial, they were assumed to appear as 
more valid cues than the current price. It was thus hypothesised that the participants’ 
predictions would correlate with the others’ predictions when these were correlated and with 
the price when the others’ predictions were uncorrelated. It was furthermore hypothesised that 
the correlation with the others’ predictions would decrease with their variance. 
Participants (n = 96) were asked to make predictions of a stock price in the trial that 
followed, conditional on information about the current stock price and predictions made by 
five fictitious other participants who ostensibly had previously participated in the experiment 
under the same conditions. The same sequence of randomly selected prices of a fictitious 
stock was presented in all conditions. The others’ predictions were generated through random 
sampling from three normal distributions with the same mean as the price and with low, 
medium or high variance. In each case, the others’ predictions were either highly correlated or 
uncorrelated with each other but always uncorrelated with the price. The new stock price was 
presented on the next trial. 
As expected, the results showed that the participants relied less on the price and that 
conformity increased when the others’ predictions were correlated compared to when they 
were uncorrelated. Thus, participants seemed to use a consensus heuristic as a result of 
heuristic processing. This interpretation is in line with interpretations of most results on 
majority influence in previous studies. 
Variance in others’ predictions had no effect on their influence. Still, the answers to 
post-experiment questions indicated that participants detected the differences in variance. 
Perhaps these differences were ignored due to that the correlation among the others’ 
predictions is the most important factor for a group to elicit social influence. 
To summarise, Study II shows that a group’s social influence increases if the 
predictions made by its members are correlated. However, the variance in their predictions 
had no effect on the influence. Thus, the tendency to use the consensus heuristic seems to be 
insensitive to the level of variation in the group’s predictions. 
 
Study III 
The results of Studies I and II demonstrate influence from a majority despite its 
predictions being random. This suggests that the participants used the consensus heuristic. 
Furthermore, in Study I, a financial reward for following a majority or minority herd led to 
influence from the majority but not from the minority. These results suggest that following a 
majority is a strong motive. In Study III, this finding was extended by investigating the 
processes mediating majority and minority influences. The focus was on accuracy motives. In 
line with Moscovici (1976, 1980, 1985), it was hypothesised that the use of the consensus 
heuristic accounts for the influence of others’ predictions when the herd is a majority. Since a 
minority was expected to elicit systematic processing, it would need to be accurate in order to 
have an influence. In contrast, a majority would have an influence regardless of whether it 
made accurate or random predictions. 
In Experiment 1, the participants (n = 64) were informed that they were participating 
in a multi-trial experiment where each trial represented a trading day. Their task on each trial 
(day) was to make predictions of the price of a fictitious stock on the next trial (day). The 
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stock price varied both systematically (referred to as price trend) and unsystematically 
(referred to as price error) across trials. On each trial, the participants received information 
about the current stock price and the predictions made by five other participants who 
ostensibly had previously taken part in the experiment under identical conditions. In two 
majority (minority) herd conditions, four (two) of the five others’ predictions were correlated 
across trials. In two (accurate) conditions their predictions were correlated with the price 
trend, and in two (random) conditions their predictions were uncorrelated with the price trend. 
The accuracy of the participants’ predictions was assessed by correlations with the price 
trend. Whether the predictions made by the majority and the minority herd had a stronger 
effect than the current price was assessed by correlations with both the herd’s average 
predictions (after partialling out the price trend when the herd made accurate predictions; 
referred to as herd error) and the current price. 
Experiment 1 investigated the influence from a majority herd compared to that from a 
minority herd when the level of accuracy of the herd’s predictions varied. On the three 
dependent measures (the correlation with price trend, the correlation with price error and the 
correlation with herd error), significant interactions between herd size and herd accuracy were 
hypothesised. More specifically, if the majority herd influence was mediated by heuristic 
processing, then for an accurate majority herd the participants’ predictions would correlate 
with the price trend and the herd error, whereas for a random majority herd their predictions 
would correlate with the herd error. In contrast, if the minority herd influence was mediated 
by systematic processing, then for an accurate minority herd the participants’ predictions 
would correlate with the price trend and the herd error, whereas for a random minority herd 
the participants’ predictions would correlate with the price trend and the price error. A pilot 
study (n = 16) showed that the participants detected the accuracy of and correlations among 
others’ predictions. 
The results in Experiment 1 indicated that the majority herd exerted more influence on 
the participants’ predictions than did the minority herd. However, the hypothesised interaction 
between herd size and herd accuracy was not found for any of the dependent variables, 
implying that the participants were influenced by a majority herd independently of accuracy 
in its predictions. Still, the results from the pilot study suggested that the participants were 
able to detect the differences in accuracy between the conditions. No minority influence was 
observed. Thus, while majority influence seemed to be mediated by heuristic processing and 
the use of a consensus heuristic, the results do not support that minority herd influence is 
associated with systematic processing. 
Experiment 2 employed another 80 undergraduates to investigate whether the 
tendency to rely on a consensus heuristic may be prevented. A condition was introduced 
where participants were instructed to focus on the accuracy in the herd’s predictions. The 
materials and the procedure were the same as in Experiment 1 except that after 10, 30 and 50 
trials the participants were asked to state either how many of the five others made accurate 
predictions (accuracy focus conditions), or how many of the others were in agreement when 
making predictions (consistency focus conditions). In all conditions, four others made 
correlated predictions, thus constituting a majority herd. The accuracy focus instruction was 
hypothesised to trigger systematic processing, resulting in participants being less influenced 
by a random herd. Since the influence of the random majority herd was expected to decrease 
when the participants focused their attention on its accuracy, an interaction between accuracy 
focus and herd accuracy was expected on the correlation with the herd error. At the same 
time, the correlation with the price error was expected to increase due to the current price 
being utilised to a larger degree. 
The results showed that the correlation with price error was larger in the accuracy 
focus conditions than in the consistency focus conditions. The correlation with herd error was 
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lower for the accuracy focus than for the consistency focus. No significant interaction 
between focus and herd accuracy was found for any of the dependent variables. The results 
thus suggested that an accuracy focus was successful in decreasing the tendency to use a 
consensus heuristic and hence possibly in increasing systematic processing. However, 
whether the majority herd made random or accurate predictions had no effect on the 
correlations with price error or herd error. 
In Experiment 1, no results support that a minority herd had a stronger influence when 
its predictions were accurate. A higher level of accuracy thus seemed to be required for this to 
occur. In Experiment 3, the level of accuracy in the minority herd’s predictions was therefore 
increased. The procedure was the same as in the preceding experiments except that the 
sequence of events on each trial was changed so that each trial consisted of an opening price 
of the day and the others’ predictions shown first, then after having made their prediction of 
the closing price the same day, the participants were shown this closing price. The opening 
prices and the closing prices were uncorrelated. The predictions made by the two others in the 
minority herd were uncorrelated with the opening price, and either uncorrelated (random 
condition) or correlated with the closing price (accurate condition). In the accuracy focus 
condition, the minority herd made accurate predictions and after trials 10, 30 and 50, the 
participants were asked to indicate who of the five others had made accurate predictions. The 
influence of the opening price, the minority herd and accuracy were assessed by the 
dependent variables correlations with the opening price, the minority herd’s average 
predictions and the closing price, respectively. 
Participants’ (n = 60) predictions correlated more with the opening price and less with 
the minority herd’s predictions in the condition with a random minority herd than in the 
condition with an accurate minority herd with accuracy focus. This suggests that the presence 
of a minority herd does not in itself elicit systematic processing. A minority influence was 
observed only when the accuracy focus was present and the herd made accurate predictions. 
Taken together, the results suggested that majority influence is mediated by heuristic 
processing. No minority influence was observed irrespective of whether the minority was 
accurate or random; instead, participants followed the current price (Experiment 1) or the 
opening price (Experiment 3). When an accuracy focus was introduced, it was successful in 
breaking heuristic processing. Then, participants were not influenced by a majority, but 
became influenced by an accurate minority. 
 
Study IV 
In line with previous research on social influence, Studies I, II and III showed that 
following a majority is a strong motive. Since a majority was influential despite its predictions 
being random, participants seemed to use a consensus heuristic. The results of Study III 
indicate that the majority influence was possible to break by asking participants to focus on 
the herd’s accuracy. In Study IV, the focus was again on accuracy motives, the aim being to 
investigate whether salient information about the validity of the opening price can counteract 
influences from a majority herd’s invalid predictions. 
The experiment simulated predictions of price movements in a stock market by 
investors varying in ‘expertise’, that is knowledge about the validity of the price information. 
The participants’ task was to predict the closing price of a given fictitious stock in 70 trials. 
On each trial, the participants (n = 80) were first presented the opening price and five others’ 
predictions, then after having made their prediction, the participants were shown the closing 
price. The predictions made by the others were uncorrelated with both the opening price and 
the closing price and thus invalid. Four of the five others (the majority) made correlated 
predictions. The opening price was either correlated or not correlated with the closing price 
(valid opening price conditions vs. invalid opening price conditions). In two conditions (non-
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expert) the others’ predictions were disclosed from the first trial, and in two other conditions 
(expert) only after 30 trials. Thus, expertise was operationalised as exposure to only the price. 
Performance was assessed by measures of decision strategy (correlations with the 
opening price vs. correlations with the others’ mean predictions) and outcome accuracy 
(correlation with the closing price). It was possible for the participants to make accurate 
predictions by utilising the opening price when it was valid. If so, their predictions correlated 
with both the opening price and the closing price. In contrast, if the participants were 
influenced by the herd, their predictions correlated only with the herd’s mean predictions. 
Both validity of the opening price and expertise were expected to increase systematic 
processing leading to the detection that the majority herd had made invalid predictions. Thus, 
participants were hypothesised to utilise the opening price when it was valid and to a larger 
extent in the expert condition. In the conditions with an invalid opening price, the participants 
were expected to be influenced by the others’ predictions, due the use of a consensus 
heuristic. Since both validity of the opening price and expertise were expected to reduce the 
majority herd influence, participants’ predictions should in these conditions correlate both 
with the opening price and the closing price. In the conditions with an invalid opening price, 
participants’ predictions should correlate with the herd’s mean predictions. 
The results from trials 31-70 showed that the participants’ predictions correlated more 
with the opening price than with the closing price in the conditions with a valid opening price 
than in the conditions with an invalid opening price. Regarding the correlation with the 
others’ mean predictions, an interaction between validity of the opening price and expertise 
revealed that in the conditions with a valid opening price, no difference between expert and 
non-expert conditions was observed, while participants in the conditions with an invalid 
opening price were more influenced by the others’ predictions in the non-expert than in the 
expert condition. Thus, as expected, a valid opening price improved the participants’ 
performance and prevented herding. Furthermore, expertise was also successful in preventing 
herding when the opening price was invalid. Herding was observed only in the non-expert 
condition with an invalid opening price. A possible explanation to this finding is that since 
both validity in the opening price and expertise prevented the use of a consensus heuristic, 
systematic processing increased. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In behavioural finance research, herding is commonly discussed in relation to theories 
of rational choice (e.g. Devenow & Welch, 1996). This thesis examines the circumstances 
under which people are influenced by herds regardless of whether or not it is rational. This 
was accomplished by comparing the influence of herds making valid predictions with that of 
herds making invalid predictions. Furthermore, rather than discussing the results in relation to 
theories of rational choice, theories of social influence postulating different types of 
information processing were drawn on to shed light on the herding phenomenon. Such 
theories are frequently evoked to explain social influence on attitudes, but have not been 
explicitly applied with this aim in research on financial decision making. The thesis therefore 
represents a new direction in research on herding in financial markets. 
 
Interpretations of the Results 
An important question in previous social influence research is whether majority 
influence elicits heuristic processing and minority influence systematic processing. The thesis 
investigates informative influence in the context of predicting stock prices, and whether the 
tendency to follow a herd differs when it constitutes a majority or a minority. In line with 
most theories of social influence (e.g. Martin, Martin et al., 2007; Moscovici, 1976, 1980, 
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1985), it was hypothesised that there is a strong motive to follow the majority, associated with 
heuristic processing. This tendency should be even stronger in prediction tasks with uncertain 
information. The general outcome of the present thesis supports the existence of strong 
majority herd influence. However, the dual-process theory proposed by Moscovici (1976, 
1980, 1985) does not receive unequivocal support: While the results indicate that majority 
herd influence is indeed primarily associated with heuristic processing, a minority herd did 
not elicit systematic processing without explicit prompting. In the following an alternative 
account is proposed, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Flow diagram of information processing in predictions of stock prices.  
In an uncertain prediction task like the one used, people are likely to search and 
evaluate the usefulness of various pieces of information or cues (Busemeyer, Byun, Delosh, & 
McDaniel, 1997). The available price information refers to the signal in Study I, the current 
price in Study II, the price error (Experiments 1 and 2) and the opening price (Experiment 3) 
in Study III, and the opening price in Study IV. Henceforth all these measures are referred to 
as the price. We assume that the participants intuitively judged the available price information 
as a more useful cue in predicting the future price than the others’ predictions. This 
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assumption was supported by the participants’ tendency to attend to the price when a minority 
of others made consistent predictions (Studies I and III). However, since the price information 
only had a probabilistic relation to the true price, it is conceivable that the participants 
preferred to follow others’ predictions if the others were a consistent majority, believing that 
they provided useful information. 
It is implied by definition that a prerequisite for herding to occur is that the members 
of the herd are perceived to be in agreement. In line with this, consistency has in various 
contexts been shown to be an important factor for a group to be influential, in particular when 
the group constitutes a minority (for a review, see Wood et al., 1994). In general, consistency 
implies that a certain number of group members are in agreement (referred to as level of 
consensus, see Martin et al., 2002) and that each group member holds attitudes, opinions and 
beliefs and acts in ways that are not contradictory. Since decision making in financial markets 
is based on repeated observations, consistency may then be perceived as the degree of 
agreement among investors’ predictions over time. Study I employed a majority-minority 
classification based on the performance of two or three other participants (a majority) or of 
one other participant (a minority) on each trial. Since the majority-minority did not consist of 
the same others from trial to trial, consistency was confounded with the majority-minority 
classification. In Study II, consistency was instead defined as the correlation between and 
variance within the others’ predictions across trials. The results showed that the others’ 
influence increased when their predictions were correlated compared to when they were 
uncorrelated. In contrast, differences in variance did not affect herd influence. The differences 
in variance were perhaps ignored if the correlation among the others’ predictions was the 
most important component. Another possibility is that participants interpreted the differences 
in variance as differences in risk taking and reacted differently to this interpretation. Some of 
the participants might have preferred to follow those with large variance because they 
considered them to be risk takers, others those with low variance because they considered 
them to be risk averse. The net effect would be to counteract any effect of variance. Drawing 
on the results from Studies I and II, the herd consisted of the same others and the variance in 
the group members’ predictions was held constant across trials in Studies III and IV. 
It was assumed that the participants primarily focused their attention on the 
consistency in the herd’s predictions instead of accuracy. This was indicated by the 
manipulation check in Study III (Experiment 2), showing that participants were more accurate 
in perceiving the correlations between the others’ predictions than they were in inferring 
whether the others’ predictions were accurate or random. Whether they were influenced by 
the herd depended on the number of others who were in agreement. This was conceptualised 
as majority herds (Studies I, II, III and IV) and minority herds (Studies I and III). 
Overall, the results of the present studies support the existence of strong majority herd 
influence. Furthermore, the perception of a majority herd appears to be associated with 
heuristic processing and the use of a consensus heuristic. In Study I, participants were 
influenced by a majority herd despite the fact that it made random predictions and that the 
price had higher predictive validity. In a similar vein, the results of Study III (Experiment 1), 
where the herd’s predictions like the price had a probabilistic relation to the future price, 
indicated that the participants followed a majority herd irrespective of the accuracy in their 
predictions. However, no minority influence was observed, in spite of a bonus for following 
the minority (Study I, Experiment 2) and in spite of the minority making accurate predictions 
(Study III, Experiments 1 and 3). Rather, the participants ignored the minority herd’s 
predictions and instead attended to the price, even when it lacked predictive validity (Study 
III, Experiment 3). Based on these observations, it is possible that regardless of whether the 
herd is a majority or a minority, heuristic processing was elicited. Thus, the consensus 
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heuristic may be accompanied by an ‘opposite’ heuristic, resulting from the belief that ‘a 
minority is seldom accurate’ (henceforth referred to as the ‘minority heuristic’). 
It is possible that this account is incomplete by not considering that an accurate 
minority herd in Study III (Experiment 3) tended to have a stronger influence than a random 
minority herd even without the accuracy focus instructions. If in light of this tendency the 
hypothesis that a minority elicits systematic processing is maintained, it should be proposed 
that systematic processing varies in degree. 
In order to break heuristic processing, both financial motives (Study I) and accuracy 
motives (Studies III and IV) were employed. The results showed that the focus manipulation 
in Study III (Experiment 2) and the ‘expertise’ and validity of available price information in 
Study IV made participants attend more to the price and less to the herd when making 
predictions. The focus manipulation in Study III was furthermore required in order to make an 
accurate minority herd influential. In sum, the manipulations were successful in breaking 
heuristic processing, but the question of whether they increased systematic processing needs 
to be discussed further. 
It was assumed that if systematic processing is elicited, participants will adopt a 
decision strategy leading to more accurate predictions. In line with the use of a minority 
heuristic, the financial reward for following a minority herd making random predictions made 
participants rely more on the price in the minority-bonus condition in Study I (Experiment 2). 
Thus, this strategy was more beneficial for participants. However, due to the price being 
valid, the strategy to follow the price was confounded with the attempt to make accurate 
predictions. Therefore, it is not possible to disentangle whether a minority heuristic was used 
or whether the minority-bonus actually induced systematic processing. Studies III and IV are 
more informative in investigating whether systematic processing occurred. The accuracy 
focus manipulation in Study III (Experiment 3) and the expertise and validity manipulation in 
Study IV induced high levels of accuracy, thus the manipulations improved participants’ 
performance. In Study III (Experiment 2), the same focus manipulation made participants 
attend to the price and decreased the influence of a majority herd irrespective of the accuracy 
of its predictions.  
A prerequisite for systematic processing to improve decisions is that the participants 
are able to assess accuracy. It is possible though, as supported by the results from the 
manipulation check in Study III (Experiment 2), that detecting accuracy in the herd’s 
predictions is a difficult task. At the same time, the results from the pilot study implied that 
the participants were able to distinguish between the differences in accuracy. It should 
however be noted that the task in the pilot study was to assess accuracy. When the assigned 
task instead was to make predictions of future stock prices, it would have been harder for 
participants to assess accuracy. It is also possible that the accuracy focus instructions made 
the participants more critical towards the others’ predictions, and hence more likely to deem 
them inaccurate. As a consequence, in order to be judged as accurate, the others’ predictions 
should have been more strongly correlated with the price trend than would have been required 
without the accuracy-focus instructions.  
In conclusion, the manipulations were successful in breaking heuristic processing, but 
more research addressing the issue of accuracy is needed in order to resolve the issue of 
whether systematic processing was also induced. 
 
Relations to Other Research 
The present findings are in some respects an extension of previous findings in research 
on majority social influence (e.g. Bohner et al., 2008; Bond, 2005, Erb et al., 2002; Martin et 
al., 2008; Martin, Hewstone et al., 2007; Martin, Martin et al., 2007). The starting point for 
this thesis was derived from the cognitive response approach regarding which source 
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(majority vs. minority) is associated with heuristic and systematic processing. According to 
conversion theory (Moscovici, 1976, 1980, 1985), minority influences should lead to more 
systematic processing than majority influences. However, a review of the previous research 
showed that the evidence is inconclusive. This has led to development of alternative theories. 
Recently, most social influence research has applied the cognitive response approach. A 
general finding from this research is that the relations between influence source and type of 
processing will be understood if additional factors are taken into account. Recent studies 
support the notion that majorities elicit heuristic processing when participants’ motivation 
and/or ability to process the information is low, and systematic processing in the presence of 
additional factors, such as personal relevance (Martin, Martin et al., 2007) and message recall 
(Martin et al., 2008), aiming to increase motivation. This conclusion was corroborated by the 
present results in that participants followed a majority regardless of the accuracy in its 
predictions. It is important to emphasise that the results were observed in situations with a 
novel issue of low personal relevance, in the absence of social conflicts, and in a situation 
where direct interaction between the participant and the others was not possible. Due to the 
noted similarities with the previous research on majority influence, the present results 
represent an extension of previous findings, suggesting a possibility to generalise findings 
from attitude research to prediction tasks. However, since the results indicate that the presence 
of a minority is also associated with heuristic processing, they are difficult to reconcile with 
the previous findings regarding minority influence. 
A possibility is that this dissimilarity partly depends on the different task devised in 
the experiments. The bulk of previous social-influence research has employed a paradigm that 
assesses participants’ attitudes after having been exposed to different messages. An initial 
message is endorsed by a group of others, and then measuring the extent to which attitude 
certainty is influenced by a subsequent counter-message arguing the opposite position. This 
task implies that participants are presented with clear information about the group’s position. 
In many other tasks, including predictions of stock prices, people themselves need to infer 
which others constitute a majority or minority. In addition, in attitude research judgments 
concern preferences expressed with certainty, whereas in the present research they are 
predictions that are either correct or incorrect and difficult to judge at the time they are made. 
A possible conclusion is that when the available information is uncertain, heuristic processing 
plays a more important role than concluded in previous research. 
The heuristic acceptance of the majority’s position and the heuristic rejection of the 
minority’s position relate to the phenomenon of the ‘wisdom of crowds’ (Surowiecki, 2004), 
referring to the fact that under most circumstances it is reasonable to assume that the 
aggregate collective judgment provides a more accurate judgment than individual judgment 
(according to the law of large numbers). The wisdom can be illustrated by an experiment 
(Treynor, 1987) in which 56 pupils in a class made independent judgments of the number of 
jelly beans in a jar. The jar held 850 beans, and the aggregate group estimate was 871. Only 
one of the pupils in the class made a better guess. Thus, the rule is that the combined 
judgment of a group will outperform the average individual (Larrick & Soll, 2006). In order to 
characterise a crowd as wise, each person in the crowd must hold private unbiased 
information (or an interpretation of such information), and each judgment must be made 
independently of others’ judgments (Surowiecki, 2004). If the individual judgments are 
aggregated so that each judgment receives equal weight, unsystematic errors cancel out. In a 
similar vein, inductive judgments of investors would yield an asset price similar to its true 
value. Importantly, the accuracy of a combined judgment increases with group size (although 
at a decelerating rate). Imagine that the class in the jelly bean experiment consisted of only 
three pupils. Adding a forth pupil would obviously have a large influence on the group’s 
average judgment. In contrast, adding the judgments made by another pupil would have little 
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influence on the average judgments made by an already large group. This rule has several 
implications for informational social influence. Most important for the present thesis is that a 
combined judgment based on a larger number of individual judgments has superior accuracy, 
which implies that they should be more influential. It is consequently more sensible to follow 
a majority than a minority, given the perception that the others’ predictions are random. 
Uncertainty in the available information may therefore increase the justification of using a 
consensus heuristic. 
Furthermore, it may be argued that participants adopted an aggregation strategy, 
implying that they were influenced by the averages across the five others when making 
predictions. Without manipulations aiming to increase systematic processing, this would 
imply that a majority was always and a minority was never influential. However, the present 
results are different. In Study II, participants were more influenced by the others’ predictions 
when they were correlated compared to when they were uncorrelated, thus showing that a 
correct aggregation principle was not used. Moreover, participants in minority conditions 
were influenced by the available price information and thus not by the average of the others’ 
predictions. Previous research has established common misappreciations of the averaging 
principle. Examples, compatible with the participants’ strategies in the present studies, 
include that consensus opinions are given excessive weight (Harries, Yaniv, & Harvey, 2004) 
and that the ease of processing increases as a function of the agreement in the information 
presented to participants (Budescu & Yu, 2006). 
In order to benefit from a group’s judgments, an individual must first perceive the 
group and then make correct inferences about its judgments. However, it is known from 
research on advice taking that people are likely to underestimate the informational advantages 
of groups. In the review by Bonaccio and Dalal (2006), it is suggested that advisors (which 
can be compared to the source of influence, the members of the herd in the experiments 
presented in this thesis) in most cases have less influence than they should given their 
knowledge. Instead of taking the advisors’ recommendations into account as much as they 
should in order to benefit from them, individuals frequently base their decisions on their own 
information. This ‘egocentric bias’ runs counter to Budescu, Rantilla, Yu, and Karelitz 
(2003), who showed that information has influence in proportion to its reliability. In the 
present experiments, the fictitious participants who constituted the herd had more influence 
than they should have, given that they made invalid predictions. Thus, the present results 
seem to be inconsistent with an egocentric bias as well as with the results of Budescu et al. 
(2003). 
Some previous research indicates that herding may be the result of a conscious 
strategy. Studies in finance have investigated what information traders use when making 
investment decisions. An issue is the role of news media and its relationship with market 
actors. Based on survey data from professional traders, Oberlechner and Hocking (2004) 
concluded that foreign exchange traders do not consider perceived truth and accuracy to be as 
important features of news as information speed, expected market impact and anticipated 
market surprise. It is suggested that investors have limited time to check the accuracy in news 
releases, and that they anticipate other traders to be equally affected by the news regardless of 
its accuracy. Thus, making decisions consistent with a herd of investors appears to be a 
conscious strategy that is more important to use than carefully evaluating the validity of the 
information. A similar observation was made when following others was not expressed as an 
explicit strategy (Welch, 2000). In a survey, financial analysts’ predictions were shown to be 
influenced by a consensus forecast regardless of whether or not it was accurate. In a similar 
vein, the present research shows a strong herd influence, independently of the level of 
accuracy of the herd’s predictions. Thus, the same pattern of findings is demonstrated in our 
laboratory experiments. In this respect, the meta-cognitive approach has potential relevance. 
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Meta-cognition refers to people’s awareness and thinking about their own thought processes. 
In Tormala, DeSensi and Petty (2007), people resisted a minority source when they were able 
to evaluate their processing strategies. Hence, it should be possible to do the same when 
persuaded by a majority. By applying, for instance, a thought-listing procedure, one may 
investigate whether the use of the consensus heuristic is due to the use of a conscious strategy 
or not.  
Most experimental research on herding has investigated information cascades. These 
studies capture people’s decisions that are based on imperfect information and are made in a 
sequence, so that one person first makes a choice that is announced to others who then follow 
in order. When every person in the sequence has the same probability of making a correct 
choice, and the preceding individuals have made the same choice, it becomes rational at a 
certain point to follow the others and disregard the private information. However, as Shiller 
(2000) argued, in stock markets investors do not usually make decisions in a sequence. In the 
present experiments, participants were instead informed about the decisions made by five 
others who had previously participated under identical circumstances as themselves. A 
difference compared to the information cascade paradigm is that the participants were 
presented with information about the others’ decisions while they also knew their private 
information. Since in the present studies information about five others was shown on each 
trial, they are more similar to information cascade experiments with endogenous timing where 
participants do not make decisions in a predetermined sequential order (Chari & Koehe, 2004; 
Sgroi, 2003). Furthermore, the participants in the present experiments knew that their 
predictions would not be disclosed to others. Due to the noted differences, the present results 
and the findings regarding information cascades are not strictly comparable. Furthermore, 
instead of focusing on rationality as in information cascades, the present studies examined 
causes of herding. 
 
Generalisations of the Results 
The reader may observe the different nature of the procedures of the present 
experiments compared to the actual stock markets. I recognise that the experimental setups 
have limitations in that they do not capture all aspects of stock investments. However, the aim 
of the studies was to investigate social influences on stock market predictions. The advantage 
of using an abstract experimental simulation is that it provides the possibility to study a 
phenomenon while excluding factors that are not the focus of the research even though they 
influence decision making. For example, when making predictions of actual stock prices, 
people may be more influenced by others with a good reputation or who are experts. Taking 
this aspect into account would possibly introduce confounds. Nevertheless, the question 
regarding the external validity of the present research remains. The tasks devised in the 
experiments are realistic in that they simulate systematic as well as random movements of 
stock prices. The systematic movements represent the market trends (bull or bear markets), 
and the random movements represent deviations from the index, that is the volatility of 
particular stocks. However, the experiments do not tap knowledge of the stock market, which 
may be an important factor in actual stock investments. The simulation of investment 
expertise (Study IV) is likewise limited since it only taps one type of knowledge of the stock 
market (a stock price’s predictive validity). Furthermore, since the present experiments 
focused primarily on the informational aspects of herding, and not on reputational concerns, 
no background knowledge of the herd was provided. Another issue is that in an actual stock 
market it may be difficult to judge which others constitute a herd, and whether the herd 
constitutes a majority or a minority. 
In the present studies professional investors were not used as participants. Although not 
claiming that the results from such experiments can always be generalised to professional 
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investors in financial markets, they still make salient the consensus heuristic that investors 
may rely on in their decision making. Such heuristics are likely to be used particularly when 
investors are under time pressure or for some other reason are incapable of thoroughly 
processing the information. Furthermore, Odean (1999) among others has documented the 
failure of expert decision makers in finance, implying that experts as well as novices are 
prone to use heuristics, leading to biases. Furthermore, previous research has pointed to the 
moderating effect that education level has on many anomalies and the response effects 
manifested in attitude research (e.g. Narayan & Krosnik, 1996), implying that university 
students may generally be less susceptible to experimental manipulations. Since we recruited 
university students as participants in the present studies, the demonstrated effects may be less 
pronounced than if we had used other categories of non-experts. Still, it has been argued that 
professionals’ investment behaviour differs from students’ behaviour in the laboratory due to 
training or regulations, which may affect the development of decision heuristics (Harrison & 
List, 2004). In a recent information cascade experiment, the performance of market 
professionals was compared to that of students (Alevy, Haigh, & List, 2007). A key finding 
was that professionals seem to use a more sophisticated decision process by utilising the 
private information more frequently and critically assess the public information more than do 
students. However, whether this applies to other research on herding is unclear. 
How serious these limitations are needs to be systematically explored in future 
research if the goal is to apply the results to actual stock markets. Another avenue to 
investigate the generalisability of the present findings is to test their invariance across 
different investment tasks in laboratory experiments. 
 
Future Research 
The present theoretical analysis was based on the position that each source of influence 
(majority-minority) leads to information processing but that the type of processing varies, 
being either heuristic or systematic. Some (e.g. Martin et al., 2008) take a different approach 
by considering which source leads to more processing effort. In the present studies we have 
interpreted low processing effort as heuristic processing, primarily operationalised as the 
tendency to follow a random majority herd, and high processing effort as systematic 
processing, operationalised as the tendency to use a decision strategy improving their 
performance. Future research needs to disentangle the issue of whether the different types of 
processing can be equated with different amounts of processing effort. This issue seems 
particularly interesting with regards to informational social influence. An example is when a 
person after thorough elaboration evaluates the available information as uncertain, and 
therefore decides to rely on a consensus heuristic. In this case the decision to use a heuristic, 
which appears as heuristic processing, is a result of systematic processing. 
As mentioned in the introduction, people may herd for different reasons. In the present 
experiments, participants were informed that the members of the herd had taken part under the 
same conditions as themselves. In situations where participants make individual decisions 
knowing that their decisions are not disclosed to others, as in a stock market, the informative 
influences will dominate. In a recent study, Quiamzade and L’Huillier (2009) showed that 
people herd with others who have made unexpected investments, believing that the others 
possessed privileged information. This belief was a more important explanation for herding 
than information about whether the others held professional investment positions. In line with 
the results in the present thesis, Quiamzade and L’Huillier (2009) underline the role of 
heuristic processing for herding by arguing that since attribution of superior information 
relates to the perception of expertise, people herd due to the use of a ‘heuristic about 
competence’. They also connect informational social influence to reputational concerns, 
which is more closely related to the normative social influences that also exist in stock 
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markets (Shiller, 2000). Research on analyses of investor behaviour does not distinguish 
among different types of social influences. However, such analyses would be suitable for 
understanding investors’ actual investment decisions and possibly the role of indirect 
influences due to investors’ similar education, training and values. 
 
A final remark 
The studies presented in this thesis suggest that there is a strong motive to herd with a 
majority. Our explanation that heuristic processing may evoke reliance on the belief that the 
majority is always and the minority is seldom correct is in accordance with Kahneman’s 
(2003) notion of System 1 (automatic, intuitive) thinking, which accounts for the use of many 
heuristics. However, the tendency to use heuristic processing may be constrained if the 
motivation to critically assess the available information is increased. This is also compatible 
with Kahneman’s and others’ (e.g. Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002) framework, 
postulating that intuitive judgments that are products of System 1 thinking will be overruled if 
System 2 (systematic, deliberate) thinking identifies it as biased. Herding may thus be 
considered as part of a broader approach to human behaviour stipulating that people use 
heuristics rather than calculations in everyday decision making. 
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